OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!
If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.
Requested Article:
Getting Things Right
Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 48
Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 48
Showing 26-50 of 48 citing articles:
Why Be Moral?
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 283-302
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 283-302
Closed Access
Nonnaturalism and Enchantment
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 65-92
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 65-92
Closed Access
Moral Conceptual Truths and Real Definitional Facts
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 121-146
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 121-146
Closed Access
Compendium
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 351-356
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 351-356
Closed Access
Methodology in Metaethics
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 13-37
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 13-37
Closed Access
Moral Realism and Its Burdens
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 38-64
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 38-64
Closed Access
Introduction
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 1-10
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 1-10
Closed Access
Strong Moral ReasonsDefense
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 205-235
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 205-235
Closed Access
List of Illustrations
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
(2024), pp. xv-xvi
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
(2024), pp. xv-xvi
Closed Access
Envoi
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 347-349
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 347-349
Closed Access
Strong Moral Reasons
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 263-282
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 263-282
Closed Access
Moral Reality
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 95-120
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 95-120
Closed Access
Deep Normativity
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 325-346
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 325-346
Closed Access
Tethering Moral Reality
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 172-201
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 172-201
Closed Access
Categoricity without Alienation
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 236-262
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 236-262
Closed Access
Objectivity
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 147-171
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 147-171
Closed Access
The Principle of Befittingness
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 305-324
Closed Access
John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer‐Landau
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 305-324
Closed Access
Rejecting norms of standing for private blame
Marta Johansson Werkmäster, Jakob Green Werkmäster
Ratio (2024)
Open Access
Marta Johansson Werkmäster, Jakob Green Werkmäster
Ratio (2024)
Open Access
Value relations sans evaluative grounds
Andrés G. Garcia
Ratio (2023) Vol. 36, Iss. 2, pp. 137-146
Open Access
Andrés G. Garcia
Ratio (2023) Vol. 36, Iss. 2, pp. 137-146
Open Access
The weight of reasons
Daniel Fogal, Olle Risberg
Philosophical Studies (2023) Vol. 180, Iss. 9, pp. 2573-2596
Open Access
Daniel Fogal, Olle Risberg
Philosophical Studies (2023) Vol. 180, Iss. 9, pp. 2573-2596
Open Access
Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints: Some Lessons from the Knowability Paradox
Massimiliano Carrara, Davide Fassio
The Philosophical Quarterly (2023) Vol. 74, Iss. 3, pp. 732-753
Closed Access
Massimiliano Carrara, Davide Fassio
The Philosophical Quarterly (2023) Vol. 74, Iss. 3, pp. 732-753
Closed Access
On neutral value and fitting indifference
Andrés G. Garcia
The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2023) Vol. 62, Iss. 3, pp. 337-347
Open Access
Andrés G. Garcia
The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2023) Vol. 62, Iss. 3, pp. 337-347
Open Access
