OpenAlex Citation Counts

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OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!

If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.

Requested Article:

The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Lisa Bortolotti
Oxford University Press eBooks (2020)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 92

Showing 26-50 of 92 citing articles:

Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 19-44
Closed Access | Times Cited: 3

What’s the linguistic meaning of delusional utterances? Speech act theory as a tool for understanding delusions
Julian Hofmann, Pablo Hubacher Haerle, Anke Maatz
Philosophical Psychology (2023) Vol. 36, Iss. 7, pp. 1394-1414
Open Access | Times Cited: 2

Epistemological issues in neurodivergence and atypical cognition: introduction
Claudia Lorena García, Alejandro Vázquez del Mercado
Synthese (2023) Vol. 201, Iss. 5
Open Access | Times Cited: 2

The End of Epistemology As We Know It
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 2

Epistemic Dependence, Cognitive Irrationality, and Epistemic Conflicts of Interests
Basil Müller
Logos & Episteme (2022) Vol. 13, Iss. 3, pp. 287-313
Open Access | Times Cited: 4

Is the biological adaptiveness of delusions doomed?
Eugenia Lancellotta
Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2021) Vol. 13, Iss. 1, pp. 47-63
Open Access | Times Cited: 5

Self-Regulation and Political Confabulation
Kathleen Murphy‐Hollies
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement (2022) Vol. 92, pp. 111-128
Closed Access | Times Cited: 3

Are delusions adaptive? An empirical and philosophical study on delusions in OCD
Eugenia Lancellotta
Philosophical Psychology (2024), pp. 1-23
Closed Access

Motivational pessimism and motivated cognition
Stephen Gadsby
Synthese (2024) Vol. 203, Iss. 4
Closed Access

On the social epistemology of psychedelic experience
Mette Marie Pedersen, Asbjørn Steglich‐Petersen
Philosophical Psychology (2024), pp. 1-19
Open Access

Must depression be irrational?
Dan Cavedon‐Taylor
Synthese (2024) Vol. 204, Iss. 3
Open Access

Challenging Stereotypes About Young People Who Hear Voices
Lisa Bortolotti, Fiona Malpass, Kathleen Murphy‐Hollies, et al.
(2024), pp. 23-39
Closed Access

Resistance to Evidence, by Mona Simion
Carolina Flores
Mind (2024)
Closed Access

On Non-Ideal Individual Epistemology
Brett Karlan
International Journal of Philosophical Studies (2024), pp. 1-7
Closed Access

Delusions: A Project in Understanding
K. W. M. Fulford, Tim Thornton
Springer eBooks (2024), pp. 1-21
Closed Access

Epistemic Libertarian Paternalism
Kengo Miyazono
Erkenntnis (2023) Vol. 89, Iss. 8, pp. 3005-3024
Open Access | Times Cited: 1

Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?
Pablo Hubacher Haerle
Philosophy, psychiatry & psychology (2023) Vol. 30, Iss. 2, pp. 133-146
Open Access | Times Cited: 1

Slobodna volja kao epistemički nevino lažno vjerovanje
Fabio Tollon
European journal of analytic philosophy (2023) Vol. 19, Iss. 2, pp. A2-15
Open Access | Times Cited: 1

Scaffolding Motivated Cognition
Daniel R. Williams
(2023)
Open Access | Times Cited: 1

Sharing responsibility for conspiracy beliefs: The agency-in-context model
Lisa Bortolotti
Resistances Journal of the Philosophy of History (2022) Vol. 3, Iss. 6, pp. e210103-e210103
Open Access | Times Cited: 2

Relating Compassion, Spirituality, and Scandal before Unjust Suffering: An Empirical Assessment
Lluís Oviedo, Josefa Torralba
Religions (2021) Vol. 12, Iss. 11, pp. 977-977
Open Access | Times Cited: 2

Defining Stereotypes and Stereotyping
Katherine Puddifoot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 13-30
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1

The Epistemic Innocence of Elaborated Delusions Re-Examined
Maja Kittel
Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2023) Vol. 15, Iss. 2, pp. 541-566
Open Access

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