OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!
If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.
Requested Article:
The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Lisa Bortolotti
Oxford University Press eBooks (2020)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 92
Lisa Bortolotti
Oxford University Press eBooks (2020)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 92
Showing 51-75 of 92 citing articles:
L’épistémologie et ses frontières
Aude Bandini
Revue de métaphysique et de morale (2023) Vol. N° 117, Iss. 1, pp. 103-129
Closed Access
Aude Bandini
Revue de métaphysique et de morale (2023) Vol. N° 117, Iss. 1, pp. 103-129
Closed Access
Anderson and Goldman on Identifying Experts
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 45-60
Closed Access
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 45-60
Closed Access
Persuasion and Paternalism
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 61-86
Closed Access
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 61-86
Closed Access
What Is Non-Ideal Epistemology?
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 1-18
Closed Access
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 1-18
Closed Access
The Obligation to Engage
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 105-132
Closed Access
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 105-132
Closed Access
Liberatory Virtue and Vice Epistemology
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 133-156
Closed Access
Robin McKenna
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 133-156
Closed Access
“La realidad habla por sí sola”. Cuando exhibir fuertes convicciones no es propiamente una virtud
Pietro Montanari
Open Insight (2023) Vol. 14, Iss. 32, pp. 165-212
Open Access
Pietro Montanari
Open Insight (2023) Vol. 14, Iss. 32, pp. 165-212
Open Access
Thought Insertion Delusion
Emilia Vilatta
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 151-C10P131
Closed Access
Emilia Vilatta
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 151-C10P131
Closed Access
Active legal capacity and its restrictions – psychiatric aspects
Paweł Zagożdżon
Routledge eBooks (2023), pp. 738-749
Open Access
Paweł Zagożdżon
Routledge eBooks (2023), pp. 738-749
Open Access
Respect-based vindication
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 112-140
Closed Access
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 112-140
Closed Access
Responding to some fundamental objections
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 85-111
Closed Access
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 85-111
Closed Access
Speculation about replacement epistemic norms
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 228-246
Closed Access
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 228-246
Closed Access
Consequentialist vindication
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 39-84
Closed Access
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 39-84
Closed Access
The importance of epistemic norms demands an explanation
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 1-38
Closed Access
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 1-38
Closed Access
Epistemic norms and action
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 141-178
Closed Access
Brian Talbot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 141-178
Closed Access
