OpenAlex Citation Counts

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OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!

If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.

Requested Article:

Rape Culture and Epistemology
Bianca Crewe, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 253-282
Open Access | Times Cited: 35

Showing 1-25 of 35 citing articles:

Relevance and risk: How the relevant alternatives framework models the epistemology of risk
Georgi Gardiner
Synthese (2020) Vol. 199, Iss. 1-2, pp. 481-511
Open Access | Times Cited: 50

THE MORALITY OF BELIEF I: HOW BELIEFS WRONG
Rima Basu
Philosophy Compass (2023) Vol. 18, Iss. 7
Open Access | Times Cited: 19

Normative Inference Tickets
Jen Foster, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Episteme (2023), pp. 1-27
Open Access | Times Cited: 14

Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence
Caroline von Klemperer
Philosophical Studies (2023) Vol. 180, Iss. 7, pp. 2175-2190
Closed Access | Times Cited: 13

Epistemic Courage
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 5

Defensiveness and Identity
Audrey Yap, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Journal of the American Philosophical Association (2023) Vol. 10, Iss. 2, pp. 261-280
Open Access | Times Cited: 11

Epistemic Contextualism and the Sociality of Knowledge
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2025), pp. 802-819
Closed Access

Rape Myths, Catastrophe, and Credibility
Emily C. R. Tilton
Episteme (2022), pp. 1-17
Open Access | Times Cited: 17

Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling
Lisa Cassell
Erkenntnis (2022) Vol. 89, Iss. 5, pp. 1759-1779
Open Access | Times Cited: 11

Presuppositional epistemic contextualism and non-ideal contexts
William Tuckwell
Inquiry (2024), pp. 1-23
Open Access | Times Cited: 1

#MeToo & the role of Outright Belief
Alexandra Lloyd
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2022) Vol. 25, Iss. 2, pp. 181-197
Closed Access | Times Cited: 5

Del conocimiento a la violencia: la dimensión epistémica en el testimonio de la violencia sexual
Aurora Georgina Bustos Arellano
Estudios de Filosofía (2022)
Open Access | Times Cited: 5

Harassment and the Privilege of Unknowing
Jennifer Doyle
differences (2019) Vol. 30, Iss. 1, pp. 157-188
Closed Access | Times Cited: 4

Contextual Injustice
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 194-210
Closed Access

Faith and Doubt in Epistemology
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 119-147
Closed Access

Positive Epistemology and the Duty to Believe
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 38-65
Closed Access

Copyright Page

(2024), pp. iv-iv
Closed Access

Skepticism and Rape Culture
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 171-193
Closed Access

Epistemic Courage
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 148-170
Closed Access

Moral and Pragmatic Encroachment
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 93-118
Closed Access

Introduction
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 1-14
Closed Access

Skepticism, Caution, and Conservatism
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 15-37
Closed Access

Do Beliefs Need Justification?
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 66-92
Closed Access

Alethurgy's Shadows

Duke University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 100-122
Closed Access

Harassment and the Privileges of Unknowing

Duke University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 78-99
Closed Access

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